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Reviewed by Peter H. Huang

Introduction
There is much to like about Professor Leo Katz’s third and latest thoughtprovoking book. It is breezily written, delightful and ingenious. His two
previous engaging books analyzed philosophical conundrums and puzzles
in criminal law.1 This book is an imaginative tour of legal paradoxes that
are related to the field of social choice, which studies the aggregation of
preferences. In a non-technical and accessible way, Katz discusses many
complex and subtle ideas, using the language of legal cases, doctrines and
theories. As he notes on page 6, some legal scholars have applied social choice
theory to analyze diverse and fundamental legal issues.2 Two recent examples
are how social choice illuminates the reasonable person standard in torts and
other areas of law3 and the notion of community standards underlying the
doctrine of good faith performance in contract law.4
Leo Katz is a brilliant and creative legal scholar and I am delighted and
honored to review this book. He and I were colleagues from 1997 to 2004.5 In
December, 1998, over dinner at Fuji Mountain restaurant in Philadelphia, we
started a multi-year series of conversations about the interpretations and legal
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implications of the impossibility theorems of 1972 economics Nobel Laureate6
Ken Arrow, mathematical economist7 Graciela Chichilnisky, philosopher
Allan Gibbard,8 economist Mark Satterthwaite,9 and 1998 economics Nobel
Laureate10 Amartya Sen.
Katz’s book explicates four fundamental legal paradoxes as the logical
consequence of the perspective that legal doctrines entail multi-criteria
decision-making. This means that each of these foundational doctrines is
logically related to a voting paradox and its corresponding literature in social
choice. Katz aptly describes the four legal puzzles he analyzes by choosing as
titles to the four parts of his book these four questions: Why does law prohibit
certain win-win transactions? Why are there so many loopholes in the law?
Why does so much of law have a dichotomous nature? Why does the law not
criminalize all that society morally condemns?
Katz makes clear the foundational nature of these four questions by making
four observations about how law professors typically teach law students.
First, many of those who teach first-year law classes ask their students the
first question above when legal doctrine forbids an outcome that the parties
themselves would have chosen. Examples of such bans discussed in the book
include limits on assumption of risk and prohibitions against indentured
servitude, organ sales, prostitution, surrogacy contracts and unorthodox
property rights. Second, many upper-level statutory law classes focus on
how lawyers restructure a client’s legal affairs to achieve his or her goals by
exploiting loopholes in the law. Such legal gamesmanship is commonplace
for business lawyers engaged in transactional practice and tax planning for
institutional and wealthy clients.11 Third, many law professors often pose
questions in first-year classes about hypothetical boundary cases that are hard
to place under the scope of a particular legal doctrine. Fourth, many law issues
revolve around the relationship between legal doctrine and morality, there
being many acts that are not punishable under criminal law despite society
finding those acts to be morally reprehensible.
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I. Eating Peas for Money and Then for Love
Katz concludes his book by recounting an incident from the youth of Rick
Beyer, who is a well-known author, award-winning documentary producer and
professional speaker. As a child, Rick despised peas. Knowing this, his mother
did not insist that he eat them. One day his mother and grandmother took
him shopping and to lunch at the Biltmore Hotel, which eight-year old Rick
thought was “just about the fanciest place to eat in all of Providence.”12 Rick
ordered an entrée that came with peas on the side. His grandmother told Rick
to eat his peas. Rick’s mother explained that Rick did not like peas and asked
his grandmother to leave Rick alone. Instead, the grandmother offered Rick
five dollars to eat the peas. Five dollars was an unheard of sum to Rick and he
forced himself to eat all the peas. Rick’s mother was furious at his grandmother
for being smug and at Rick for being easily bought. A few weeks later, Rick’s
mother got her revenge. She made peas and told Rick: “You ate them for
money. You can eat them for love.” With no effective counterargument, Rick
felt compelled to eat peas that day and thereafter when his mother cooked
them, even though he still hated them.
This tale illustrates a logical paradox related to all four of the legal perversities
that are a focus of the book. Rick’s mother argues that Rick cannot refuse
to eat peas for love since he already had eaten peas for money. The logical
structure of this argument is the same as many arguments Katz makes in the
first part of his book to explain the limits that laws impose on consent. The
common structure is one where rankings over two alternatives change upon
introduction of a third alternative. Decision theorists and game theorists refer
to such preferences as menu dependent: the ranking of alternatives depends
on the alternatives available. Such menu dependence often results from the
introduction of what are viewed as (seemingly) irrelevant alternatives.
Menu dependence is an example of a context effect, which has been defined
as “the phenomenon in which the setting of the question changes the nature
of the answer.”13 As behavioral economics emphasizes,14 individual preferences
are not exogenously fixed and stable objects that can be inferred by observing
people’s choice behavior or elicited by having people answer hypothetical
survey questions. Instead, individual preferences are constructed endogenously
by acts of choice and elicitation. Preferences are also formed over time and
with repeated experience. The most famous context effects are the framing
effects and preference reversals that Tversky and Kahneman documented in
their no longer politically correct “Asian disease” experiments.15
12.

Rick Beyer, Rick Beyer: Biography, available at http://rickbeyer.net/index.php?page=
bio&display=36.

13.

Kevin Karty, Context Effects: When Setting Changes Everything, available at http://www.
affinnova.com/blog/bid/89285/Context-Effects-When-Setting-Changes-Everything.

14.

See generally Claire A. Hill, The Rationality of Preference Construction (and the Irrationality
of Rational Choice), 9 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 689 (2008).

15.

Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of
Choice, 211 Science 453, 453 (1981).

134

Journal of Legal Education

Economist Amartya Sen provides this example of menu dependence:16 a
host offers his guest the choice of a medium-sized slice of cake or a small slice
of cake. The guest loves cake but chooses the small slice because she thinks it
would be unseemly to choose the bigger slice. The host then remembers that
he also has a large slice and offers that option as well. The guest now believes
it is socially acceptable to choose the medium-sized slice over the small slice
because there is a large slice that she can have but does not choose. Sen points
out that the guest’s selection depends on the menu of choices offered. For each
menu, she has a well-defined ordering: she wants the biggest slice available
subject to the social norm of not choosing the largest slice offered.
It is helpful to explicitly analyze the menu dependence and preference
reversal that is implicit in the peas incident. Let A = Rick does not peas, B =
Rick gets five dollars, C = Rick demonstrates his love for his mother. Under
Rick’s original preference ordering, his love for his mother was not enough to
get him to eat peas. In symbols, A > C, which is read as Rick preferred A to
C. Rick’s grandmother’s introduction of alternative B resulted in Rick getting
five dollars to eat peas. In symbols, this is written as B > A, and read as Rick
preferred B to A. Because Rick demonstrating his love for his mother is worth
more to Rick than getting five dollars, this means that in symbols, C > B, which
is read as Rick preferred C to B. Because C > B and B > A, then it follows by
transitivity that C > A, meaning that Rick eats peas to demonstrate his love for
his mother. Thus, the introduction by Rick’s grandmother of the (seemingly)
irrelevant alternative B resulted in a reversal of Rick’s preferences between the
two alternatives of A: Rick does not eat peas and C: Rick demonstrates his
love for his mother.
Katz proposes in the second part of his book that exploiters of loopholes
introduce a seemingly irrelevant alternative precisely to cause a preference
reversal between a pair of relevant alternatives. He draws the analogy
between exploitation of loopholes and manipulation of voting rules, arguing
that loopholes are the logically unavoidable consequence of law involving
multiple criteria decision-making. In other words, because the law strives to
balance partly conflicting objectives, society cannot eliminate the presence of
loopholes. As he observes on page 211, it follows from the seminal result of
social choice—Arrow’s impossibility theorem17—that society cannot eradicate
agenda manipulation in otherwise desirable voting procedures.
Here is a quick introduction to Arrow’s theorem. A website about
innovative applications of mathematics also presents an insightful synopsis
of Arrow’s theorem.18 The appendix of this review contains a more in-depth
discussion of the theorem and other social choice scholarship. A little bit
of notation will make it easier to describe Arrow’s theorem. Suppose there
16.

Amartya Sen, Internal Consistency of Choice, 61 Econometrica 495, 501 (1993).

17.

Kenneth J. Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. Pol. Econ. 328 (1950).

18.

Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, available at http://www.whydomath.org/node/voting/
Arrow’s_Impossibility_Theorem.html.

Book Review: Why the Law is So Perverse

135

are N > 2 voters with preference rankings over a finite set F of candidates. A
voting procedure can be thought of as a computer program or algorithm that
accepts as inputs the profile of N individual rankings over F and produces
as its output a social ranking over F. One can imagine many possible voting
procedures. For example, dictatorship by voter 1 is the voting procedure where
the social ranking over F coincides with voter 1’s individual ranking over F,
regardless of all other voters’ rankings over F. Arrow’s theorem demonstrates
that any voting procedure that satisfies a particular set of minimally desirable
conditions must be a dictatorship by some voter.
Philosopher Alfred F. MacKay introduced an ingenious and intuitive
analogy between social choice and the scoring of multi-event sports
competitions:19 voters correspond to athletic events, alternatives correspond
to athletes, individual rankings over alternatives by voters correspond to
individual performances by athletes in events, voting procedures correspond
to scoring procedures and the social rankings over alternatives correspond to
overall rankings of athletes. Arrow’s theorem states that any scoring system
that satisfies a particular set of desirable conditions must rank athletes in the
order they finish in just one specific event regardless of how the athletes finish
in all other events.
To appreciate the multiple criteria decision-making version of social choice,
view the individual athletic events as different multiple criteria. Katz’s book
in essence develops the implications of realizing that laws exemplify multiple
criteria decision-making. Sometimes, laws are explicit about requiring the
consideration of multiple criteria. For example, the Securities Act of 1933
requires that the Securities and Exchange Commission not only protect
investors, but also “promote efficiency, competition and capital formation.”20
At other times, laws are only implicit about requiring consideration of multiple
criteria. Examples of the multiple criteria that laws may require considering
include accountability, deterrence, efficiency, equity, fairness, happiness,
incentives, insurance, justice, objective well-being, precedent, predictability,
punishment, retribution, reversibility, risk-allocation, sustainability,
transparency and uncertainty. Some laws and public policies involve often
delicate balancing of multiple criteria. Other laws involve the consideration of
several elements or multiple factors.
Katz draws connections in the third part of his book between the usually
binary nature of law and Chichilnisky’s impossibility theorems proving the
prevalence of discontinuities in preference aggregation.21 Katz connects
discontinuities in social choice with menu dependence by observing that
drawing a sharp line between two polar endpoints of a continuum is only
19.
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necessary when considering how to rank some third intermediate alternative
relative to each of the pair of endpoint alternatives (211). When society draws
that somewhat arbitrary sharp line a discontinuity in the social ranking will
result.
In the fourth part of his book (206-08), Katz relates how menu dependence
can explain under-criminalization. It should not be surprising that how society
and criminal codes rank a pair of alternative blameworthy acts can depend on
whether and which other blameworthy acts are also being ranked. He analyzes
non-felonious villainies which entail acts of misconduct that do not appear
to be so immoral when viewed in light of the whole spectrum of all possible
wrongdoing and yet will seem quite immoral when compared to a particularly
innocuous offense.
II. Normative and Interpretive Concerns
One characteristic feature of the book is Katz’s introduction of many
examples from numerous areas of law and life. For example, he details how
scoring anomalies occur in the apparently unexpected and seemingly unrelated
context of international women’s ice figure-skating competitions (96-102).22
He also explains how the determination of student exam grades based on at
least two distinct criteria, such as content and presentation, can depend on socalled irrelevant alternatives (118-21). No review of the book can do justice to
each and every one of the author’s wide-ranging examples of legal perversities
and related extra-legal perversities. Rather this review merely notes another
example of multi-criteria ranking familiar to law professors, the U.S. News &
World Report ranking of law schools—the annual spring ritual that has become
contested,23 deleterious,24 infamous25 and usually misunderstood.26
Two more substantive concerns are about how Katz makes use of renowned
social choice impossibility theorems. The first is a normative concern and the
second is an interpretive concern. Both are about what lawyers and the legal
system can and should make of several foundational voting paradoxes. The
central thesis of the book is that many seemingly puzzling and unrelated aspects
of law have parallels to voting anomalies. On this point, Katz is undoubtedly
correct. His book amply demonstrates that all the legal perversities that he
22.
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considers are logically related to at least one and often several well-known
results in social choice theory.
My reading of the book raises three questions. First, does Katz draw the
appropriate normative conclusions about legal perversities based on their
connections to social choice theory? In other words, what are the legal ethics
and professionalism implications of his book? Second, how does each of the
legal perversities in the book follow from a particular social choice theory
result? In other words, what is the precise theoretical connection between each
of the legal perversities discussed and the impossibility theorem in social choice
theory? Third, can we reinterpret our understanding of the seemingly dismal
and negative impossibility theorems from social choice in a constructive and
positive way to suggest how society can make the best of legal perversities?
In other words, what are benign interpretations and positive versions of the
social choice impossibility theorems and their implications for how society can
deal with what Katz calls legal perversities?
On the first question, the author draws the normative conclusion that
because loopholes are logically unavoidable features of multi-criteria legal
doctrines, their use cannot be “convincingly criticized” and “[t]o take lawyers
to task for availing themselves of this fact of logic is like calling a chess player
unethical for making a strategic sacrifice” (211).
As for the second question, Katz mentions on page x in the
Acknowledgements section of his book that economic theorist Andrew
Postlewaite27 vigorously pressed him “on the exact connection between Arrow’s
theorem and loopholes” (x). This is because Katz does not precisely do so in
his book. What he does (108-09) is to offer a cogent explanation of Arrow’s
impossibility theorem in the multi-criteria decision-making context. He also
provides details about how menu dependence is the root cause of these four
specific examples of loopholes: contrived defenses, obtaining political asylum
by subterfuge, asset protection and tax shelters (109-18). Nonetheless, the book
may be exasperating to readers trained in social choice from an economics
or mathematics perspective. Almost all economics graduate students learn
about Arrow’s theorem in the spring semester of the required first–year core
microeconomics course.28 Many second-year economics graduate students
learn more about social choice in an optional course that is part of any subfield
of economics related to advanced microeconomics or mathematical economics.
Those with training in (mathematical) economics are likely to find the book
frustrating because it does not follow the format and set-up of notation,
definition, axiom, theorem and proof—the accepted style of presentation in
modern economic and social choice theory.29
27.
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On the third question, Donald Saari,30 a major contributor to social choice
theory and a prolific mathematical social scientist, offers novel insights about
what causes negative conclusions about voting rules by explaining how these
impossibility propositions result from an axiom essentially requiring voting
procedures to ignore explicitly stated and useful information about individual
preferences.31 This informational perspective allows Saari to provide benign
interpretations and positive versions of these impossibility theorems. 32
The rest of this book review addresses these three questions.
III. Legal Ethics and Professionalism Implications
Katz introduces his discussion of loopholes with a humorous comic strip
by the cartoonist and Harvard Law School-educated lawyer Ken Fisher,
also known by his pseudonym of Ruben Bolling (71). Bolling’s cartoon (72)
depicts an episode from the legal practice of Harry Richards, Esq., who is a
lawyer for children. Harry’s legal specialty is advising and representing kids in
playground disputes. In this cartoon, pony-tailed Suzy consults Harry when
she finds a long line of kids waiting in front of the ticket window of a movie
theater showing Day of the Chipmunk. Suzy asks her friend Amanda to let her cut
in line. Amanda does not agree to let her cut in ahead of her but is willing to
let Suzy cut in behind her. The child behind Amanda objects. Suppose there
is a “no backsies” rule, which forbids cutting in line in front of a child unless
that child agrees. Suzy thus consults with attorney Richards to ask if Suzy can
do anything besides going to the back of the line. Harry suggests that, because
“frontsies” is a perfectly legal transaction, Suzy can and should convince
Amanda to let her cut in front of Amanda because—immediately upon doing
so—Suzy will then let Amanda cut in front of Suzy. In this roundabout manner,
Suzy will able to use two perfectly legal “frontsies” to effectively achieve the
one “backsie” to which the child behind Amanda objects. Harry tells Suzy
that he is in fact writing a law review article that is titled: “Double Frontsies
as a Creative Solution to the ‘No Backsies’ Rule” for the Journal of Juvenile
Jurisprudence. Suzy finds Harry’s legal advice to be a brilliant strategy to
nullify the prohibited rule and believes that Richards is worth his fee. The first
frame of the cartoon notes that Harry only accepts cash and specifically does
not accept gum, pets or siblings for payment.
The whimsically amusing nature of this example of creative lawyering and
exploitation of a loophole (accomplishing a prohibited “backsie” by two legal
“frontsies”) belies the typically much more serious and ethically disturbing or
morally questionable nature of exploiting legal loopholes. The stakes involved
30.
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are usually much higher than in this comic strip and the consequences more
substantial. The idea of achieving the outcome of a transaction that is forbidden
or prohibitively costly through an equivalent series of permitted transactions
lies behind the practice of what is known as financial engineering and the
concept that is known as financial arbitrage. The notion of constructing
an equivalent portfolio of securities for the sole purpose of replicating the
financial payoff of another security is the key insight behind the derivation of
the acclaimed Black-Scholes options valuation formula.33 It is also the crucial
step in the proof of the well-known cornerstone of modern corporate finance
known as the Modigliani-Miller theorem about optimal corporate capital
structure.34
My niece K when she was a bit younger proposed her own clever and original
arbitrage. One Saturday, K, her mother, her two brothers, S and D, and her
aunt J went shopping at Target. Aunt J accompanied them to look after S and
D, while K’s mom took K to buy her something for her personal wardrobe. In
the interest of fairness, K’s mom decided that S and D would each get a toy. K
wanted a particular Barbie doll that was also for sale, so she asked if she could
also get that. K’s mother, however, said that each child would get just one
item. K cleverly asked two questions of Aunt J. First, could Aunt J buy the doll
for K and keep it at Aunt J and Uncle Peter’s home? Second, could K then
please borrow the doll from Aunt J indefinitely? Aunt J said that she (Aunt J)
would have to ask K’s mom both questions. K’s response was that K’s mom,
who is the younger sister of Aunt J, is not the boss of Aunt J, thus, in effect,
raising jurisdictional concerns and procedural issues.
These stories are amusing and do not involve the large financial stakes
that are common when financial derivatives are used to engage in regulatory
arbitrage,35 or the serious consequences that can occur when attorneys
engage in the practice of “loophole lawyering.”36 A definition of loophole
lawyering is that it “occurs when an attorney is concerned less with applying
the whole law than with finding a way to accomplish the goals of the client
by exploiting a perceived ambiguity in the language of the rule or statute.”37
Loophole lawyering is “generally accepted by commentators when an attorney
is interpreting a federal or state statute that dictates the requirements and
limitations on a corporation’s or individual’s commercial activities.”38 An
33.
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Econ. 637 (1973).
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theorems/theorems.html. See also Peter H. Huang & Michael S. Knoll, Corporate Finance,
Corporate Law, and Finance Theory, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 175 (2000).
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example of the acceptance of loophole lawyering in the case of business or
financial planning is that “many people hire attorneys or accountants for
the sole purpose of finding ‘loopholes’ in the tax codes; such a practice is
not heavily criticized.”39 In light of Arrow’s impossibility theorem implying
that legislative intent and statutory intent are problematic notions,40 it is
ironic that “the apparent rationale for accepting loophole lawyering is that
the legislature intended to leave open certain possibilities. The assumption is
that if legislators did not intend to leave open these certain possibilities, they
can easily amend laws to prohibit these actions.”41 To counter the negative
popular culture portrayals and tainted public images of lawyers,42 “there must
be a concerted effort to eliminate the opportunities for loophole lawyering.”43
The practice of loophole lawyering contrasts with the interpretive attitude of
professionalism, under which “a lawyer has an obligation to apply the law to
her client’s situation with due regard to the meaning of legal norms, not merely
their formal expression.”44
Interestingly, Katz does not define the word loophole anywhere in his book.
He states:
[W]hat constitutes a loophole is not among the questions I seek to answer.
That is because when I speak of loopholes I mean pretty much what
everybody else means—seeming glitches in the formulation of a law (it could
be either statutory or case law) that allow clever lawyers to help their clients
do things that appear to subvert its purpose. But although we don’t need a
precise definition of loopholes before we can try to explain them, we do need
some good examples, both to clarify what we are talking about and to serve
as test cases against which to evaluate different explanations of the loophole
phenomenon (73).

He offers these six examples of loopholes: asset protection, contrived
defenses, forum shopping, litigation-proofing, obtaining political asylum by
subterfuge and tax shelters (73-77).
Katz sets himself the task of addressing these three questions about
loopholes: “Why are they there? Given how much offense they give, why have
they not been eradicated? And finally, what about lawyers who exploit them—
are they doing something dishonorable, unethical or illegal?” (77) He answers
all three questions based on the realization (107) that there is a connection
between legal doctrines and multi-criteria decision-making. And he explains
39.

Id. at 287, n.18.

40.

But see, Arthur Lupia & Matthew McCubbins, Lost in Translation: Social Choice Theory is
Misapplied Against Legislative Intent, 14 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 576 (2004-2005).
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43.

Id. at 311.

44.

W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1167, 1168 (2005).
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(136) how two particular types of voting manipulation, agenda manipulation
and strategic voting have as their counterparts loopholes that are legal versions
of killer amendments and intentional fouls, respectively.
Katz’s normative conclusion that lawyers cannot be blamed for exploiting
loopholes because loopholes are the unavoidable consequence of laws balancing
and synthesizing multiple criteria does not squarely engage the reasons most
people take to task lawyers who exploit loopholes. It is not the presence or even
logical necessity of loopholes that people find troubling per se. There are all
sorts of reasons that explain why lawyers who exploit loopholes trouble many
people. At its core, the exploitation of loopholes appears unseemly because it
seems unfair that lawyers use legal technicalities to subvert justice. People are
troubled by the exploitation of a particular loophole for a particular gain to
a particular client by a particular lawyer. Whether and how much people are
troubled by the exploitation of a loophole depends on the nature of the legal
matter involved, identity and reputation of the client, identity and reputation
of the lawyer, nature and size of the client’s gain or loss avoided and nature of
the loophole involved. The logical fact that legal loopholes must exist because
of the multiple criteria nature of laws does not address their exploitation.
Ultimately why people find loophole exploitation troubling is a question that
can only be answered empirically and perhaps experimentally.
Three examples from popular cultural portrayals of lawyers and their
legal practice illustrate the fact that people do not find every instance of
exploitation of a loophole objectionable or ethically questionable. First, there
is the decision by Mitch McDeere, the character that Tom Cruise portrays in
the movie, The Firm,45 to find and turn over evidence to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation that every lawyer of Bendini, Lambert & Locke, the mob law
firm that employed him, was guilty of overbilling. McDeere chose to do this
despite knowing that some of the firm’s lawyers are laundering money for
the mob and involved in the murder of two associates. He saw it as better to
cooperate with the FBI over a legal technicality, reach an agreement with the
Morolto mobster brothers and not break any laws in doing so. Earlier in the
movie, Mitch is advised by a senior mentor partner to “bill everything, even
when he is thinking about client matters in the shower.”46
Second, the pilot episode of the USA Network television series “Suits,”47
introduces the show’s quirky and unlikely premise. Harvey Spector, a cutthroat,
sharp-tongued ace closer and senior partner at Pearson Hardman, one of
Manhattan’s top white shoe corporate law firms, hires Mike Ross, a brilliant
college dropout who has an eidetic memory, encyclopedic legal knowledge
and passion for the law and passed the bar exam without attending law school.
Because Pearson Hardman only hires Harvard law school graduates, Harvey
and Mike both lie about Mike being a Harvard law school graduate. Mike
45.
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is the central protagonist, naïve hero, and principal character of the series
and often exploits loopholes to manipulate the law to help morally deserving
individuals.
Third, in 1931, Alphonse “Al” Capone, the Chicago gangster, mobster,
racketeer and leader of a Prohibition-era criminal syndicate, was indicted,
convicted and sentenced to eleven years in prison on federal charges of income
tax evasion and failure to file income tax returns. Capone had successfully
been defended in earlier investigations alleging racketeering charges. Elmer
L. Irey, the chief of the enforcement branch of the United States Treasury
Department’s Bureau of Internal Revenue, assigned a Treasury Department
Intelligence Unit agent and a former accountant, Frank J. Wilson, to
investigate Capone’s criminal dealings because Irey believed that Capone
could be successfully prosecuted under a Supreme Court decision holding
that any income from criminal activities is subject to federal income tax.48
Many commentators found it disconcerting that Capone’s infamous
criminal career came to an end over tax fraud, which seems relatively minor
when compared with the many other crimes that Capone allegedly committed,
which include bootlegging liquor, bribing government officials, gambling,
murder, prostitution and smuggling.49 To critics, the United States government
used federal tax law as a pretext for punishing a publicly vilified individual for
more serious crimes. One can view the use of tax law to be an example of
exploiting a loophole because Congress did not enact the Internal Revenue
Code to enforce crimes that did not involve tax law.50 Much of the public and
the media, however, likely believed that any exploitation of tax laws to catch
Capone served justice and was perfectly fine. Audiences usually cheer when
Capone, portrayed by Academy Award winning actor Robert De Niro, gets
his due in the courtroom scene from the blockbuster film, The Untouchables.51
Much of popular culture depicts—and much of the public sees—most
lawyers as able and willing to exploit loopholes on behalf of their clients.
Non-lawyers are more likely to criticize those lawyers who exploit loopholes
to subvert justice or increase the substantial financial positions of their already
wealthy individual or institutional clients. One definition of a legal loophole is
“an imperfection in the linguistic formulation of a legal text whereby a literal
interpretation of that text does not conform to the definitive interpretation
dictated by good-faith application of formal legal reasoning techniques.”52
Another similar definition of a loophole is “that place where the letter of the
rule underenforces the spirit” of the law.53 Perhaps more familiarly, “a loophole
48.
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provides an opportunity to live to the letter of the law, at the expense of the
spirit of the law.”54 Finally, Black’s Law Dictionary defines loophole as “a way to
avoid a rule without violating its literal requirements.”55
On March 19, 2012, I attended a session featuring Enron’s former chief
financial officer Andrew Fastow in his first university lecture after serving a
six-year sentence in federal prison.56 Fastow focused on his and Enron’s
exploitation of what he termed loopholes, as the word is defined in Black’s
Dictionary. Fastow told students from the Leeds School of Business and the
Law School at the University of Colorado-Boulder that he was guilty, but not
of securities fraud, despite having pleaded guilty on January 14, 2004, to two
counts of conspiracy to commit securities and wire fraud.57 Fastow stated that
he was guilty instead because he “used the rules to subvert the rules,” and
that complex and vague rules created “a business opportunity” and “[t]here
are people who look at the rules and find ways to structure around them. The
more complex the rules, the more opportunity.”58 He claimed that what he and
Enron did had the full approval and complete knowledge of Enron’s attorneys,
accountants and board of directors, adding that “I thought we were freakin’
geniuses.”59 He concluded by remarking that what “I should have asked is not
what is the rule, but what is the principle.”60
Fastow acknowledged that, although he did not think he was committing
fraud, “the net effect of all these deals was to create a misrepresentation of the
company.”61 To a securities lawyer, Fastow’s distinction is nonsensical because
Rule 10b-5 promulgated under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 193462 prohibits deceit, fraud and misrepresentation or omission of material
facts in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.63 The financial health
of a company is clearly a material fact, defined as one whose “disclosure would
Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke it to Do
So, 78 Ind. L.J. 459, 508 (2003).
54.
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change the total mix of facts available and there is a substantial likelihood that
a reasonable shareholder would consider the facts important to her investment
decision.”64
Fastow said that his son asked him why he went to jail. Instead of saying
he was guilty of securities fraud, Fastow told his son he was guilty of violating
the spirit—but not the letter—of the law. And he told this hypothetical story:
Suppose that the son asked him if he could go to a party and Fastow said yes
on condition his son promised that he would not drink alcohol during the
party. Fastow’s son agreed and drove to the party. Once he arrived, his friends
offered him alcohol. The son declined as he had promised.
Suppose that one of Fastow’s son’s friends then offered him a newly
developed “beer pill”—a solid that is chewed. Assume that the beer pill has
the same intoxicating effects as drinking beer. Fastow asked his adolescent son
whether he would accept the pill. The son answered, “Of course not.” Fastow
then asked, “Why not?” since chewing the pill does not break the promise
not to drink alcohol. Fastow’s son explained that chewing a beer pill would
violate the intent of his promise, and thus was prohibited under the promise
that he had made. Fastow’s point was that his adolescent son understood that
violating the spirit of a promise in effect nullifies the promise—even though the
“letter of the law” was not violated.
Earlier that evening, Fastow said he regretted that his imprisonment meant
not being present as a father as his two sons grew up. Ironically, at least one of
Fastow’s sons seemed to have learned an ethical lesson in his absence. Fastow
apparently did not learn that lesson at Tufts University, in business school at
Northwestern University’s Kellogg School of Management and at the start of
his business career while working on then innovative asset-backed securities at
Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company.
Loren Steffy, the business columnist for the Houston Chronicle, observed
that65 Fastow “didn’t quite seem to convey the larger truth to the UC-Boulder
students. No one who was involved in as many questionable deals as he was
could believe they were simply being clever if they were being honest with
themselves. Fastow wasn’t, and it appears he still isn’t.”66 It was a fascinating
performance to watch—one likely rooted in self-denial to avoid cognitive
dissonance.
It was disheartening to hear some of the students who attended Fastow’s
talk state afterwards that what they learned was that one should not get caught
and be more clever and judicious than Fastow in choosing which loopholes to
exploit and how to do it. The purported “lessons” that some students learned
64.
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from Fastow’s lecture are troubling and partly explain the controversy over
universities inviting felons who are convicted of white-collar crimes to speak
on campus about ethics.67
What some students learn in law school also explains why noted legal
scholar and critical race theorist Richard Delgado believes that lawyers who
engage in excessive formalism and/or purposefully inflict various types of what
Delgado deems as violence do not deserve to be happy.68 The types of violence
that Delgado argues some lawyers intentionally inflict include obfuscation,69
ordinary violence,70 narrative violence71 and punishment.72 As Delgado notes,
many “[l]awyers’ favorite argument is drawing the line—i.e., making things as
unclear as possible in order to reap advantage from the confusion.”73 Delgado
also points out how a small number of law students are happy to learn that law
practice can offer them “an outlet for wheedling, cheating, bluffing and taking
small advantage.”74 He is concerned for the happiness of those other lawyers
who at least in their first few weeks of law school were “highly principled
students, steeped in the best ideas of Western civilization.”75
The most recent infamous example of an ultimately unsuccessful attempt
at exploiting a loophole also involves ambiguity of language and the
divisive nature of modern American presidential politics.76 It is, of course,
“President Clinton’s lawyer-like attempt to get around acknowledging his
sexual indiscretions by claiming in his deposition, ‘It all depends on what the
meaning of “is” is,’ and his lawyer-like definitional dance around whether oral
sex was, in fact, ‘sexual relations.’”77 Most Americans found Clinton’s evasive
word play desperate, funny, sad, and/or slimy. Clinton’s hyper-technical
parsing of the English language instead of acknowledging its common sense
plain meaning exemplifies the stereotypical image of lawyers behaving badly
67.
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and using legalese to obfuscate what they really mean. Many people have
very low opinions of lawyers precisely because lawyers are trained to—and
do—use jurisdictional challenges and what non-lawyers view as procedural
technicalities to avoid losing on the merits of a case. There is a widespread
belief that most lawyers are insincere, untrustworthy and more than willing to
engage in deceit and subterfuge on behalf of their clients.78
Each of the 50 American states is responsible for much of the discipline
and self-imposed regulation of lawyers in the form of the rules of professional
responsibility that states adopt and the sanctions that states impose for
violations of those rules. The American Bar Association has promulgated and
revised the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, most of which just about
every state has chosen to adopt, with sometimes considerable variation. The
preamble to the model rules states that “[a]s advisor, a lawyer provides a client
with an informed understanding of the client’s legal rights and obligations and
explains their practical implications. As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts
the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system.”79 Two of the
key phrases that appear in the preceding two sentences are “legal rights” and
“under the rules of the adversary system” because those phrases demonstrate
how the model rules bound attorney zealousness and constrain lawyers to be
faithful to laws and rules.
A legal ethics scholar observes that, “[l]awyers wrongly believe that they are
permitted or required to exploit legal loopholes.”80 The comment following
one model rule makes it clear that lawyers are “not bound, however, to press for
every advantage that might be realized for a client. For example, a lawyer may
have authority to exercise professional discretion in determining the means by
which a matter should be pursued.”81 In particular, lawyers can “refer to relevant
moral and ethical considerations in giving advice. Although a lawyer is not a
moral advisor as such, moral and ethical considerations impinge upon most
legal questions and may decisively influence how the law will be applied.”82
Another model rule states that lawyers “shall not counsel a client to engage, or
assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a
lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct
with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to
determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.”83 Finally, a
model rule warns that “[l]awyers are subject to discipline when they violate
or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or
78.
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induce another to do so or do so through the acts of another, as when they
request or instruct an agent to do so on the lawyer’s behalf.”84 As with much of
day-to-day lawyering, decisions and judgments about exploiting loopholes are
left for lawyers to make on a case-by-case basis as long as lawyers do everything
they are obligated to do under the rules of professional conduct of the relevant
state(s) and as long as they do not do anything that is prohibited by the rules
of professional conduct of the relevant state(s). Professional decision-making
and judgment are skills that improve with effort, exercise, experience, practice
and mindfulness.85 Loopholes differ by appropriateness, context, nature,
situation and size. A junior associate and senior partner at some law firm
may have quite different attitudes toward exploiting the same loophole with
either one being more or less in favor of doing so. Because some loopholes can
involve contested ethical and moral values, there is often quite a bit of “play
in the joints” or “wiggle room” about exploiting loopholes. Such discretion
provides lawyers with choices and responsibilities for those choices.
From the observation that Arrow’s impossibility theorem implies that
loopholes are unavoidable, it does not logically follow as Katz normatively
concludes that exploiting loopholes is acceptable. The decision to exploit a
particular loophole for a particular client in a particular case at a particular time
is a particular choice that a particular lawyer makes. Like the rest of us, lawyers
are responsible for the choices they make. To say that choices are unavoidable
does not absolve us from the personal and professional responsibility that
comes with making them.
At Fastow’s talk, he answered a question about what it was like to be
present at Enron generally and particularly at meetings of Enron’s board of
directors by saying that Enron was a heady place where the culture was to
exploit aggressively all possible loopholes as much and as often as possible. It
should not be surprising that corporate cultures, organizational expectations
and social norms about what is deemed appropriate behavior can influence
how people actually behave. People can be motivated to comply with cultures,
expectations and norms to avoid guilt and shame from non-compliance or feel
loyalty and pride from compliance.86 Because of such motivational cascades
and emotional contagion, the behavior of leaders can set examples that inspire
or disillusion others in organizations and societies, causing those others to
engage systematically and systemically in ethical or unethical behavior. In
particular, those who teach legal ethics and professionalism to law students
can discuss why achieving career satisfaction and life satisfaction are more
compelling and positive motivations for ethical and professional behavior
84.
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than such negative and stressful motivations as the avoidance of guilt or the
fear of being caught, disciplined, sanctioned or sued.87
IV. Legal Perversities and Social Choice Impossibility Theorems
This section is intended to clarify the nature of the connection between what
Katz calls “legal perversities” and the social choice impossibility theorems
of Arrow, Sen, Chichilnisky, Gibbard and Satterthwaite. The Katz book
focuses on legal manifestations of menu dependence and the related social
choice phenomena of cycles, loopholes and discontinuities (see appendix for
details). Katz explains (57-68) how Sen’s theorem on the impossibility of a
Paretian libertarian is related to why laws often prohibit win-win transactions.
He explains (62-65) how Sen’s theorem is related to what Katz calls the antifairness theorem, a result by two well-known law and economics scholars,
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell.88 Katz also explains (66) how Kaplow
and Shavell’s proposition demonstrates that fairness-based legal doctrines
and the Pareto principle lead to cycles. And he explains (124-5) how Kaplow
and Shavell’s result involves the independence of irrelevant alternatives and
implies the prevalence of loopholes.
The second part of the Katz book analyzes why the law is so full of loopholes.
The author’s answer is that loopholes in the law are the result of menu
dependence that arises from law involving multi-criteria decision-making.
Cycles in social choice theory reflect intransitivity of the social preference
that results from a voting procedure. A cycle that results from a voting rule
opens up the possibility of manipulating the agenda of that voting procedure.
Katz argues that exploiting loopholes is the legal equivalent of manipulating
voting agendas (104-5). A more precise statement about how Arrow’s theorem
in the multi-criteria decision-making context is related to legal loopholes than
the author provides might help answer two important questions. First, how
can policy makers design laws and statutes to avoid particular cycles and
loopholes? Second, how can those who desire particular loopholes effectively
lobby state legislatures and Congress to produce them?89
Katz and Alvaro Sandroni, an economist and also a mathematician,90 coauthored an unpublished working paper about why the law induces cycles
in choices by a law-abiding decision-maker.91 They define a decision-maker’s
87.

Lawrence S. Krieger, The Inseparability of Professionalism and Personal Satisfaction:
Perspectives on Values, Integrity and Happiness, 11 Clinical L. Rev. 425, 435-45 (2005).

88.

Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Any Non-welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates
the Pareto Principle, 109 J. Pol. Econ. 281, 283-84 (2001).

89.

Ostas, supra note 52, at 521-24; Mayer, supra note 54, at 740-44.

90.

Alvaro Sandroni, Kellogg School of Management Faculty Directory, available at http://www.
kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/directory/sandroni_alvaro.aspx; Deborah Leigh Wood,
Faculty Research: Alvaro Sandroni, MEDS: Assume Nothing, Kellogg World Alumni
Magazine (Winter 2003), available at http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/kwo/win03/
departments/sandroni.htm.

91.

Leo Katz & Alvaro Sandroni, Why Law Breeds Cycles (July 1, 2010) (manuscript on file with

Book Review: Why the Law is So Perverse

149

motivations to be a ranking over alternatives. They do not assume that
motivations can be inferred from observing choice behavior. In other words,
motivations differ from the standard economic notion of preferences because
neoclassical economics assumes that preferences are revealed by observed
choices. They also introduce the idea that in addition to making a choice that
satisfies any feasibility constraints, a decision-maker has to satisfy what they call
a rationalization constraint. In other words, they assume that a decision-maker
must justify her decision by some rationale from a set of possible rationales.
Rationales include such quasi-ethical principles or social norms as abiding
by the law, anti-discrimination, etiquette, honor and personal autonomy or
freedom of choice. For example, Sen’s menu dependence story of not eating
the largest slice of cake that a party host offers illustrates the rationale of
etiquette.92
The rationale they focus on is being law-abiding. Using particular
examples, they illustrate cycling in the choices by a law-abiding decisionmaker with respect to the criminal law defenses of duress, necessity and selfdefense and the tort law of negligence. Their examples illustrate their more
general proposition that all legal rules and the Pareto principle lead to cycles.
Their framework treats legal rights as constraints, much like philosopher
Robert Nozick’s view that rights are side-constraints.93 Bruce Chapman, a
law professor whose research includes applications of social choice theory to
legal reasoning, analyzes the relationship between how rights are modeled and
Sen’s impossibility theorem. 94
Saari explains that cycles related to law are the result of problems with the
coordination of piecemeal information concerning the parts versus the whole
of a system. 95 More generally, Saari demonstrates that cycles arise from how
local information about rankings is pasted or pieced together to form global
information about rankings.96 Saari presents a compelling example of a couple
and their in-law caught in an emotional “cycle leading to continual squabbles
and hurt feelings,”97 based on a model by two UC Irvine mathematical
psychologists, Louis Narens and R. Duncan Luce, about extended sympathy
the author). See also Vadim Cherepanov, Alvaro Sandroni & Tim Feddersen, Rationalization,
Dauphine Workshop on Economic Theory (Nov. 25-26, 2010), available at http://leda.
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and interpersonal comparisons of utilities.98 Saari also describes cycles related
to democracies and majorities99 and the apportionment methods of the
United States Congress.100 Saari uses the phrase “some assembly required”
to capture the importance of using “connecting information” to transform
the many individual parts of a system into a coherent and well-functioning
whole.101 He offers examples of related unexpected part-whole phenomenon
in gambling,102 medical testing,103 public school accountability in California104
and financial hedging.105 Saari explains how all of these and other troublesome
situations in many diverse and seemingly unrelated contexts106 have a common
mathematical and theoretical structure.107
Part three of the Katz book focuses on why so much of the law has
a dichotomous nature. The famous mathematical economist Graciela
Chichilnisky introduced the condition of continuity on preference aggregation
and in so doing, pioneered a field that has come to be known as topological
social choice because of its use of the mathematical field known as topology
that studies continuity in abstract settings. Chichilnisky offers two intuitive
rationales to motivate the naturalness of her axiom that desirable voting rules
be continuous.108 First, a desirable voting rule should produce an outcome
that is tolerant of small errors in measuring the preferences of individual
voters. Second, a desirable voting rule should satisfy structural stability in
the sense that small changes in the preferences of individual voters should
lead to small changes in the social preference that voting rule produces.
The discontinuity of a voting rule means that for some small changes in the
preferences of individual voters, that voting rule produces large changes in
the resulting social preference. Chichilnisky postulates that a society will and
should avoid voting rules that can generate catastrophic jumps in the resulting
social preferences.109
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Katz explains that Chichilnisky’s impossibility theorem has a profound
implication for the credibility of law and, correspondingly, the foundations
of justice in a society (176-81). He uses the phrase “sharp boundaries” to refer
to the discontinuities that are the subjects of Chichilnisky’s impossibility
theorems. And he observes that in the typical situation where the law generates
only one of a pair of two possible outcomes, Chichilnisky’s theorem implies
that two very similar legal cases may produce very different legal outcomes.
For example, in the criminal law context, there can be two defendants who are
so alike that most people are unable to distinguish between their cases and yet
a court may find one defendant guilty and the other defendant not guilty. The
possibility that comparable legal cases may result in such drastically different
and even diametrically opposed outcomes makes the legal process appear to
be arbitrary, capricious and unjust. Such legal discontinuities can jeopardize
the rule of law by leading the public to question the authority, fairness and
legitimacy of law.
The fourth part of Katz’s book explains under-criminalization in terms of
menu dependence. He also provides two additional social choice explanations
of under-criminalization (204-6). First, any ranking of comparative guilt
involves the two criteria of the harm done by and the mental state of a defendant.
Different ways of synthesizing those two criteria will unsurprisingly result
in different rankings of relative blameworthiness. Second, Katz considers
a particular form of under-criminalization in which criminal law seems to
grant volume discounts in the sense of imposing punishment for a series of
crimes that is less than the sum of the punishments for each of the separate
crimes (194-7). He explains how the volume discount problem is analogous
to voting rules exhibiting what Katz terms non-monotonicity (133-34), which
means that a voter will benefit from strategically voting counter to his or her
true preferences, or what is also known as counter-preferential voting. The
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem proves that insincere or tactical voting is a
general problem.
Concluding Thoughts
Despite the qualms this review raises, Katz’s book is definitely worthwhile
and should be on the reading list of legal scholars, especially those interested
in real-world examples from any of these subjects: bankruptcy law, civil
procedure, constitutional law, contract law, criminal law, criminal procedure,
economic analysis of law, environmental law, jurisprudence, legal ethics,
legal philosophy, property law, statutory interpretation, tax law, tort law and
voting rights law. Katz’s mind is unique among legal scholars. His book offers
a distinctive perspective about how to perceive, think about and view legal
issues. He has the rare ability to connect many seemingly unrelated legal
phenomena in an insightful and penetrating analysis.
The social choice theory literature that underlies and unifies the book is
a powerful tool and prism through which to approach multi-criteria legal
decision-making. In building on the prominent impossibility theorems of
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Arrow, Sen, Chichilnisky, Gibbard and Satterthwaite, Katz truly is standing
on the shoulders of intellectual giants. His speculation that other legal
perversities are likely related to and the consequence of other social choice
results likely is correct. He essentially calls on other scholars to discover other
legal perversities and their connections to other social choice impossibility
theorems (126). In this and many other ways, the book is provocative and only
improves upon re-reading.
Reading—and re-reading—this book has provided the opportunity to reflect
on how to make sense of the menu dependence that inevitably pops up in all
instances of multi-criteria decision-making by societies, laws and individuals.
The phenomenon of menu dependence and its close relatives, cycles,
loopholes and discontinuities, raise deep questions about what rationality
means and should mean. Arrow observed that “[a]n economist by training
thinks of himself as the guardian of rationality, the ascriber of rationality to
others and the prescriber of rationality to the social world.”110 Economists
are trained to believe that a hallmark of rationality is transitivity of choice
behavior. Conversely, economists view intransitivity of choice behavior as
evidence of irrationality.111 Casual empiricism suggests that if you point out
to people that their choices are intransitive, they usually will change their
choices to avoid intransitivity. It would be interesting to use the methods of
experimental philosophy to investigate people’s intuitions about loopholes,
menu dependence and the desirability of transitivity of individual choice
behavior.
That people typically find voting paradoxes troubling is evidence that
people usually view intransitivity as psychologically disturbing. Arrow’s
theorem means that some configuration of individual preferences can lead
under majority voting to an intransitive social ordering. Arrow’s theorem
demonstrates that voting intransitivities are possible. Ever since Arrow proved
his theorem, social choice theorists have proved that voting intransitivities are
not just possible, they are likely, extensive and severe. For example, political
scientist Richard McKelvey proved that majority voting over multi-dimensional
spaces of alternatives can end up at almost every possible outcome via judicious
agenda manipulation.112 This result is known as McKelvey’s chaos theorem.
Despite the undeniably huge impact of Arrow’s impossibility theorem
and its progeny on our collective understanding of the paradoxical outcomes
that are unavoidable in social choice, people including some legal scholars
continue to speak of and think about legislative or statutory intent as if those
were coherent and sensible notions. More generally, people including some
legal scholars continue to speak of and think about individual preferences as
110. Kenneth J. Arrow, The Limits of Organization 16 (W. W. Norton & Co. 1974).
111.

But see generally Walter E. Block & William Barnett II, Transitivity and the Money Pump, 15
Q.J. Austrian Econ. 237 (2012).

112. Richard McKelvey, General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models,
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if that was a well-defined and unproblematic notion. Perhaps the ultimate and
most important contribution that Katz makes in this book is to convincingly
persuade the reader that Arrow’s theorem particularly and social choice
generally have far-reaching implications about what it means for societies,
laws and individuals to engage in multi-criteria decision-making.
Katz does for social choice theory in law what 2005 economics Nobel
Laureate113 Thomas C. Schelling did for game theory in conflict resolution.114
Neither a social choice theorist nor a mathematical economist, Katz is a law
professor and noted scholar of criminal and corporate law. He admirably
succeeds at explaining and illustrating why menu dependence is ubiquitous in
law and so prevalent even in multi-criteria decision-making by an individual
(109). He even develops implications of his analysis of legal loopholes (121-23)
for the propriety of lawyers being partisan advocates engaging in professional
persuasion. His argument in that context (123) applies more generally to the
behavioral law and economics critique that human decision-making is irrational
in the sense that it is subject to framing effects. The perspective that people are
irrational when their behavior exhibits menu dependence loses coherence and
surprise when you realize that menu dependence is an unavoidable feature of
multiple criteria decision-making.
Appendix: A Brief Social Choice Primer for Legal Scholars
This appendix provides legal scholars a guide to social choice in general and
four distinguished impossibility theorems in particular. It offers motivating
examples and precise statements of those impossibility theorems. The
conventional interpretations for these theorems and the field of social choice
are negative in the sense that most commentators view social choice theory as
mathematically proving that no voting procedure is fair. These commentators
include legal scholars applying impossibility theorems and concluding that
difficulties are unavoidable with all collective or group decision-making
processes. There is a vast social choice literature full of extensions and
refinements of these and other impossibility theorems. Current social choice
research tends to be philosophical or technical. Katz’s book mostly eschews the
technical and emphasizes the philosophical. This appendix does the opposite,
while still avoiding mathematical details and emphasizing conceptual
understanding. Additionally, it highlights research by Donald Saari and his
coauthors that explains what goes wrong in these impossibility theorems and
provides benign interpretations and positive versions of them.
Ken Arrow published his Ph.D. dissertation as the book Social Choice and
Individual Values and proved what is now known as Arrow’s impossibility
113.

The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2005, The
Official Web Site of the Nobel Prize, available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/
economics/laureates/2005/ (Robert J. Aumann also received the 2005 economics Nobel).

114. Robert V. Dodge, Schelling’s Game Theory: How to Make Decisions (Oxford Univ. Press
2012); Robert Dodge, The Strategist: The Life and Times of Thomas Schelling (Hollis Pub.
Co. 2006).
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theorem.115 In so doing, he pioneered the modern theory of social choice,
which has been described as “a rigorous melding of social ethics and voting
theory with an economic flavor.”116 In the foreword to the most recent and
third edition of Arrow’s path-breaking work,117 Eric S. Maskin, 2007 economics
Nobel Laureate118 and a former student of Arrow, points out that there was “a
sporadic literature on the subject before Arrow, going back (at least) to JeanCharles Borda and the Marquis de Condorcet in the late eighteenth century.
But the earlier essays lacked the generality and power of Arrow’s approach and
the subject did not take off until Social Choice.” Maskin continues: “by the time
the second edition was published, in 1963, there were already several hundred
works building on the book. A recent count on Google Scholar turned up
over ten thousand citations.”119 Maskin concludes his foreword by cogently
observing that:
A book’s importance can be crudely gauged by how many other works cite it.
But perhaps a better measure is its longevity: how long it continues to inspire
new work. By that criterion, Social Choice and Individual Values is an amazing
success: having passed its sixtieth birthday, it continues to generate a steady
stream of original research. I suspect that the same will be true when it reaches
one hundred.120

Arrow also co-authored a monograph that includes a multi-criterion
decision-making version of his impossibility theorem.121 Arrow’s numerous
contributions to social choice appear in the first volume of his collected
works.122 An interdisciplinary peer-referred journal titled Social Choice and
Welfare,123 and a professional organization with the name Society for Social
Choice and Welfare,124 are both devoted to positive and normative aspects
115.

Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (Yale Univ. Press, 3d ed. 2012)
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116. Gennaro Amendola & Simona Settepanella, Optimality in Social Choice, 36 J. Mathematical
Soc. 44 (2012).
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of social choice and welfare economics. There is a new interdisciplinary field
named computational social choice,125 which, for example, relates Arrow’s
theorem and computability.126 Social choice research today includes empirical,
experimental and theoretical work by economists, mathematicians, operations
researchers, philosophers, political scientists and sociologists. Social choice
examines the aggregation of individual preference orderings into a social
preference ordering. A preference ordering denoted by > is a binary relation
over a space of alternatives that satisfies two properties. First, > is complete,
which means that for any two alternatives A and B, A > B, or B > A, or both.
The string of symbols “A > B” is read: “alternative A is (weakly) preferred
under the preference ordering > to alternative B.” Second, > is transitive,
which means that for any three alternatives A, B, and C, if A > B and B > C,
then A > C.
The simplest example to illustrate the problem that lies at the heart of
and motivated Arrow’s theorem is the majority voting paradox attributable
to Marquis de Condorcet, a mathematician and French Enlightenment
philosopher. Suppose there are three voters named K, S, and D faced with a
choice among three alternative movies that all three of them will see together: A
(Katy Perry: Part of Me), B (Battleship), and C (“Comic Character Film”). Assume
that K’s preference ranking is A > B > C, S’s preference ranking is B >> C >>
A, and D’s preference ranking is C >>> A >>> B. The social preference ranking
>>>> is determined by the result of pairwise majority voting. Because both K
and S prefer B to C, B >>>> C. Because both K and D prefer A to B, A >>>> B.
Because both S and D prefer C to A, C >>>> A. This voting cycle means that
the resulting social preference >>>> fails to satisfy the condition of transitivity
even though each individual preference ordering satisfies transitivity.
Arrow was moved to build his famed theorem by a desire to understand
political parties and national interests. His initial interest was in developing
a theory of the corporation;127 he wanted to determine how stockholders with
differing expectations come to agree on a particular corporate investment.
Arrow quickly realized that paradoxical cycles like the one in the last paragraph
are possible with pairwise majority voting. Arrow’s next interest related to his
theorem occurred in the context of voters having preferences over political
parties.128 His third and final impetus was his desire to explain the concept of
a nation’s interests.129
125. The COMSOC Website, Computational Social Choice, available at http://www.illc.uva.nl/
COMSOC/.
126. H. Reiju Mihara, Arrow’s Theorem and Turing Computability, 10 Econ. Theory 257 (1997).
127. Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya Sen, & Kotaro Suzumura, Kenneth Arrow on Social Choice
Theory, in 2 Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare 3, 9-10 (Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya
Sen & Kotaro Suzumura eds., North-Holland 2011).
128. Id. at 12.
129. Id. at 13-14.
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Arrow introduced a set of axioms on voting systems that reflect a set of
normative criteria or ethical desiderata. Unrestricted Domain (UD) means that
the set of possible individual preference rankings over the set of alternatives
is not restricted in any manner. Non-Dictatorship (ND) means that the social
preference ranking cannot simply be the preference ordering > of a particular
individual unless all other voters also have the same preference ordering >.
Pareto Efficiency (PE) means that if all voters rank some alternative A above
another alternative B, then so does the social ranking. Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) means that if each voter’s preference ranking
between any two alternatives, A and B, stays the same, then so does the social
preference ranking between A and B, even if voters’ preference rankings
between other pairs of alternatives, such as A and C, B and C or C and D,
change. Notice that by requiring that the preference aggregation process
results in a social preference ranking, transitivity (and completeness) of the
social binary relation over the space of alternatives also is required. With these
definitions, Arrow’s impossibility theorem can be stated formally.
Arrow’s theorem: If there are two or more voters and three or more
alternatives, there is no voting system that aggregates individual preference
rankings into a social preference ranking that also will satisfy UD, ND, PE,
and IIA.
Arrow’s introduction of an axiomatic approach permitted the simultaneous
analysis of all voting procedures at once as opposed to examining particular
voting rules one at a time as had been the prior method of studying voting.
Arrow’s theorem also created a tradition in modern social choice of proving
impossibility theorems to demonstrate that certain sets of apparently desirable
and seemingly reasonable axioms about aggregation procedures are logically
incompatible. Many of the well-known results in social choice theory are in
the form of such impossibility propositions about groups of conditions that
voting procedures are unable to satisfy simultaneously.
The standard negative interpretation of Arrow’s theorem is that no voting
method is fair or perfect, in the sense that any voting method will fail to satisfy
at least one normatively attractive criterion. A particularly provocative way to
state Arrow’s theorem is that any voting procedure satisfying the apparently
desirable conditions of UD, PE, and IIA must be dictatorial. This means that
any such voting procedure generates a social preference ranking that coincides
with the individual preference ranking of just one voter, independent of the
individual preference rankings of all the other voters. Because the social
preference ranking is that of just one individual voter, that individual is called
a dictator.
Donald Saari offers this alternative benign and non-dictatorial explanation
of Arrow’s theorem: IIA is not consistent with the assumption that voters’
individual preference rankings are transitive.130 More precisely, IIA causes
voting procedures to ignore the intensity of pairwise rankings that is a
130. Donald G. Saari, Basic Geometry of Voting 87-88 (Springer 1995).
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crucial part of the information already contained within the given individual
preference rankings.131 Saari’s insight also implies how to provide a positive
version of Arrow’s theorem, namely modify IIA to allow voting procedures to
make use of the preference intensity information that IIA excludes.132 Saari’s
informational explanation of Arrow’s theorem also applies to explain other
impossibility theorems.
Katz’s book alludes to and makes use of three other renowned impossibility
theorems. The first one is from economist Amartya Sen.133 Katz discusses this
well- known example and story that Sen used to illustrate his theorem: suppose
that there are two individuals, Ms. Prude and Mr. Lascivious, with preference
rankings over who reads a risqué book, such as Lady Chatterly’s Lover. These
are the three possible social alternatives: P = Ms. Prude reads the book, L =
Mr. Lascivious reads the book, and N = nobody reads the book. Ms. Prude’s
preference ordering denoted by > ranks the alternatives: N > P > L, and Mr.
Lascivious’ preference ordering denoted by >> ranks the alternatives: P >> L >>
N. L should not be chosen because Ms. Prude and Mr. Lascivious both rank
P above L. It seems reasonable to assume that each person should have the
right to decide whether to read the book. Then, Ms. Prude cannot be forced
to read the book, so P cannot be chosen. Similarly, Mr. Lascivious cannot be
forbidden to read the book, so N cannot be chosen. Thus, neither P nor N
can be chosen. Hence, none of the three alternatives P, L, or N can be chosen.
Sen’s framework envisions that a benevolent social planner chooses one
alternative from those available using information about individual preference
rankings. Sen defines a social choice function to have as inputs profiles of
individual preference rankings and as its outputs particular social alternatives,
which a social planner selects. A social choice function satisfies Unrestricted
Domain (UD) if the set of possible individual preference rankings over the set
of alternatives is not restricted in any manner. A social choice function satisfies
Pareto Efficiency (PE) if it never chooses an outcome when there is another
alternative that everybody strictly prefers. A social choice function satisfies
Minimal Liberalism (ML) if two individuals exist whose preferences can veto
some social alternatives. The motivation for the ML condition is a fundamental
tenet of liberalism that certain decisions and issues are personal and should
naturally fall within a single individual’s purview. Oft-cited examples are what
a person wears or the kind of music that a person listens to in his or her car.
With these definitions, here is a formal statement of the impossibility theorem
of Sen.
Sen’s theorem: If there are at least two people with preference rankings over
a set of at least three social alternatives, there is no social choice function that
satisfies UD, PE and ML.
131.

Donald G. Saari, Hidden Mathematical Structures of Voting, in Mathematics of Democracy
221, 224 (Bruno Simeone & Friedric Pukelsheim eds., Springer 2006).

132. Id., at 225.
133. Amartya Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. Pol. Econ. 152 (1970).

158

Journal of Legal Education

Donald Saari demonstrates that Sen’s ML condition is incompatible with
the assumption that voters’ individual preference rankings are transitive.134
More precisely, ML causes social choice functions to ignore the information
about transitivity of the given individual preference rankings.135 Saari’s insight
also implies how to provide a positive version of Sen’s theorem, namely
modify PE to allow social choice functions to make use of the information
about individual preference rankings being transitive that ML excludes.136
The second other impossibility theorem that Katz refers to is from
mathematical economist Graciela Chichilnisky, who generalized Arrow’s
theorem from a finite set of alternatives to a multi-dimensional space of
alternatives.137 In doing so, Chichilnisky created the field of topological social
choice theory. Chichilnisky’s framework draws upon differential geometry,
differential topology and algebraic topology, three subfields that are part of the
standard first-year graduate mathematics curriculum. The connection between
local and global perspectives toward information about preferences explains
why topological methods play such prominent roles in social choice theory.
Differential topology is a branch of mathematics that uses differential calculus
types of methods to analyze local properties of an object and combine those
local approximations into a global understanding of the object. For example,
there is a mathematical construction known as partitions of unity that “can be
used to patch together objects defined locally.”138
The simplest example that illustrates Chichilnisky’s theorem involves two
people choosing where to have a party or picnic on a beach that is a circle
around a lake.139 Without loss of generality, assume the radius of this circle is
one. Each of the two people picks any point on this unit circle as their most
preferred location for the beach party. A social aggregation rule takes the two
chosen points and selects a point on the unit circle where the beach party will
be located. An example of a social aggregation rule is the one that selects the
same location for the beach party for all possible pairs the two people pick.
Such a social aggregation rule chooses a constant fixed location independent of
what the two people pick. Another example of a social aggregation rule is one
that selects as the beach party location whatever person one picks regardless
what person two picks. Such a social aggregation rule amounts to dictatorship
134. Donald G. Saari, Connecting and Resolving Sen’s and Arrow’s Theorems, 15 Soc. Choice &
Welfare 239, 239-40 (1998).
135. Id. at 240-47. See also Lingfang Li & Donald G. Saari, Sen’s Theorem: Geometric Proof, New
Interpretations, 31 Soc. Choice & Welfare 393 (2008).
136. Saari, supra note 134, at 259-60. See also Donald G. Saari & Anne Petron, Negative Externalities
and Sen’s Liberalism Theorem, 28 Econ. Theory 265 (2006).
137.
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by person one. Neither the constant nor dictator social aggregation rule is
interesting because each completely ignores the most preferred location of at
least one voter.
Consider these conditions on social aggregation rules. A social aggregation
rule respects Anonymity (A) if only the most preferred locations of the
two individuals matter and not which person prefers which location. A
social aggregation rule satisfies Continuity (C) if small changes in the most
preferred locations of the individuals lead to small changes in the point that
the social aggregation rule selects as the location of the beach party. A social
aggregation rule respects Unanimity (U) if, when both individuals’ most
preferred locations for the beach party coincide, that point also is chosen
by the social aggregation rule. With these definitions, one of Chichilnisky’s
impossibility theorems can be formally stated for this particular example.
Chichilnisky’s theorem: There is no social aggregation rule which maps
pairs of points on the unit circle onto points on the unit circle that satisfies C
and respects A and U.
Saari provides a benign interpretation of Chichilnisky’s theorem and
explains how the continuity of a social aggregation rule is a technical condition
that assures behavior at one point is like the behavior near that point.140 The
mere requirement of continuity implies that a social aggregation rule treats the
space of individual preferences as essentially a line or more generally a space
that satisfies a topological property known as being a contractible space. In
the above beach example, the space of individual preferences is a unit circle,
which is not contractible.
Chichilnisky and economist Geoffrey Heal prove that social choice
paradoxes arise if and only if the underlying space of individual preferences
is not contractible.141 An equivalent way of stating this result is that a social
aggregation rule that satisfies A, C, and U exists if and only if the underlying
space of individual preferences is contractible, which means that it is
topologically trivial because it can be continuously deformed to just a single
point. The space of individual preferences being contractible in essence limits
the degree of permissible diversity in preferences. Chichilnisky introduces
a precise measure of social diversity in terms of initial endowments and
preferences and proves that a society can allocate resources efficiently by
markets or social choice if and only there is not excessive social diversity.142
On the other hand, mathematical social scientist Scott Page introduces a
mathematical economic theory of diversity and provides conditions under
140. Donald G. Saari, Informational Geometry of Social Choice, 14 Soc. Choice & Welfare 211,
221-26 (1997). See also Jason Kronewetter & Donald G. Saari, From Decision Problems to
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which diverse perspectives, heuristics, interpretations and mental models
improve the accuracy of collective predictions and the ability of groups to
solve diverse problems.143 These two mathematical economic theories about
diversity imply that there are costs and benefits to diversity that a society has
to balance in determining a socially optimal amount of diversity.
The third other impossibility theorem to which Katz alludes is due
independently to philosopher Allan Gibbard144 and economist Mark
Satterthwaite.145 All three of the impossibility theorems thus far assume that
individuals vote according to their true preferences. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite
theorem proves that voters often have incentives to vote tactically instead of
according to their preference rankings. Real-world examples of the GibbardSatterthwaite theorem happen when people choose not to waste their votes
on a candidate who has no chance of winning. This was the case with some of
the supporters of these independent candidates in U.S. presidential elections:
Ralph Nader in 2000, Ross Perot in 1996 and 1992, Jesse Jackson in 1988 and
1984, and John B. Anderson in 1980.146
Each of a finite number of individuals reports a preference ranking over a
finite set of alternatives. A voting system uses the reported individual preference
rankings to select one winning alternative. A voting system is susceptible to
strategic manipulation if a voter with complete knowledge about how other
voters are going to vote and of the voting system has an incentive to vote in a
way that does not reflect her true preferences. A voting system is dictatorial if
one voter can determine the winning alternative independent of how others
vote. With these definitions, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem
can be formally stated.
Gibbard-Satterthwaite’s theorem: If there are more than two alternatives,
any voting system that is not susceptible to strategic manipulation must be
dictatorial or it eliminates particular eligible alternatives from ever winning.
Satterthwaite demonstrates a formal equivalence between Arrow’s theorem
and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.147 Saari details how the IIA condition
from Arrow’s theorem is related to strategic voting.148 Saari also provides a
geometric explanation of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.149
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